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Abstract: This study examines how the introduction of new technology had a differential 
effect of the work of a matched set of two workgroups of professionals. One group of 
internal auditors, at a major multinational corporation based in an emerging market, 
embraced the new methods of working, prompting new identity creation that reinforced their 
adherence to one of the conflicting institutional logics, and increase their professionalism. 
The other group, also internal auditors but working at a major domestic company in the same 
industry and country, resisted the change, allowing management to exploit the opportunity to 
undermine the professionalism of the workgroup, while engaging in symbolic management 
to reap the external benefits of what looked like good corporate governance. The study 
demonstrates, theoretically, the role that identity formation plays (or may not play) in 
embedding institutional change, and how a professional logic can be reconciled with 
organization identification. It also shows, practically, how in certain conditions resistance to 
technology can disrupt professional integrity. 
Keywords: Institutional logics, professionalism, organizational identity, corporate 
governance, internal audit 
Introduction 
The literature of organizational change is replete with examples of resistance to 
technology and how to overcome it. The literature of institutional theory is likewise full of 
examples when practices persist long after their utility has eroded. This study examines the 
intersection of those perspectives through a pair of matched case studies in which efforts to 
create greater efficiency and effectiveness have opposite effects on the behaviour of two 
workgroups of professionals. One group, the internal audit function of a subsidiary of a 
multinational corporate in an emerging market, showed greater adherence to a professional 
logic. Doing so simultaneously enhanced its identification with the organization and its aims. 
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The other group, internal auditors at a large domestic company in the same industry, felt 
stronger identification with the organization, only to see their function undermined by senior 
management and eventually all but abandoned, with a loss – to the individuals and the 
organization – of their professional integrity.  
The study involves two food-industry companies in Egypt.  Both were implementing 
new information systems for enterprise resource planning (ERP), a technology shift that 
promised simultaneously to facilitate better executive decision-making while also securing 
enhanced capabilities for monitoring management and controlling its actions. Achieving 
both with one mechanism means improving both sides of the dilemma in corporate 
governance: how to advance business objectives without losing control. That is, the 
technology supports both the service and the control function that the corporate governance 
literature ascribes as the complex goal of directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), and that the 
literature of audit ascribed as the conflict of interest in both external audit (Marnet, 2007) 
and its much-less-understood cousin, the internal audit profession (Elbardan, Ali, & 
Ghoneim, 2015). 
To examine the cases, we review data from interviews, documents and observations 
(Yin, 2003), using the matched pair of cases to increase validity (Eisenhardt, 1989). The data 
were analyzed thematically and then theoretically, using institutional theory to consider both 
themes of both professionalism and organizational change.  
The surprise in this analysis came with the realization that rather than seeing heightened 
conflicts between organizational and professional identities, each case showed a different but 
unitary response, one that strengthened both and the other that undermined professionalism 
and then contributed to undermining organizational allegiance as well. Here is it not a simple 
case of the march of the machines, in which technology diminishes human agency, but 
different marches, where different humans exert different agency, differently. 
Institutions and identity 
Two broad theoretical traditions seek to explain social interactions: institutions and 
identity. Institutions are the sets of rules that inform social decisions, enabling certain 
choices while constraining others. As a result, they reinforce certain patterns of behavior, 
which contributes to their own persistence, even beyond the point that the institution has 
outlived its usefulness (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) showed how 
institutions diffuse and become embedded in society in three ways: through mimetic, 
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normative and coercive isomorphism, as social actors – and especially organizations – copy 
each other’s actions, adhere to perceived standards, or react to threats of sanction. 
Acceptance of and adherence to the patterns of behavior creates a sense of legitimacy both 
for the actor and with others in the social system.  
Identity theory can be viewed as a carrier of institutions from the field, through the 
organization, to the individual. Identity involves individuals finding meaning in symbols, 
rituals, artifacts and patterns of behavior that give them a sense of belonging to a group 
(social identity: cf. Tajfel, 1974). The values they hold imply rules of action that justify 
meaning and a sense of self (self-identity: cf. Stryker, 1968). Self-identity theory suggests 
that individuals are multi-faceted, performing a variety of roles that may have conflicting 
motivations. Employees often identify with an employer and face threats to that identity in 
the face of workplace change. They then engage in coping strategies and other forms of 
identity work (Brown, 2017), including conforming, resisting, and (merely) acting a part 
(Collinson, 2003). Similar reactions have been observed among elite professionals, despite 
the protection they enjoy from their special skills and knowledge that defines their 
profession (Brown & Coupland, 2015). 
Institutional logics and work 
According to the institutional logics perspective, institutions arise from within certain 
broad categories of social practices. Friedland and Alford (1991) suggest that orders, such as 
the state, the family, religion, or capitalism give a common base of meaning – root 
metaphors, the basis for norms, the sources of identity, etc. – to the rules, rituals, and 
artifacts. Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) extend the range of orders: community, 
the corporation and markets. Notably, Thornton and colleagues also view professions as an 
order.  
As a set of rules creates legitimacy and becomes institutionalized, the justification for it 
is taken for granted, and its logic ceases to be articulated. Green, Li, and Nohria (2009) 
suggest an analogy to a syllogism in logic: “If A and B, then C.” Institutionalization means 
we accept the validity of C without even considering A or B, let alone whether “if” leads to 
“then”. The base understandings of the “orders” provide the first step in that legitimation.  
Thornton et al. (2012) argue that professional logics are based on networks who share a 
source of legitimacy in their personal command of knowledge, with authority from the 
collective adherence to norms established by the profession. On that basis, society grants 
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professions – archetypally, medicine, law, educators, and accountancy – privileges. For 
many centuries, the state allowed these professions to self-regulate, and thus collectively to 
monopolize economic value (Krause, 1996). Such power-based views of professions  
underpin competition, for example, between law and accountancy over control of advisory 
services for mergers and acquisitions (Abbott, 1988). It is also reflected in how Thornton et 
al. (2012) describe the professional order as involving strategies rooted in increasing 
personal reputation and individual-oriented capitalism.  
As background conditions change, however, the tendency of institutions to persist can 
leave them out of sync with developments. How institutions change in response has been 
theorized as “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio, 1988), in which actors undertake 
agentic behavior to expose the flaws of the logics and undermine the legitimacy of the rules. 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) broaden this concept to “institutional work”, which comes in 
forms that disrupt, maintain or create new institutions. 
The professions can be viewed as engaging mainly in institutional “maintenance” work. 
When, for example, a corporate or financial crisis threatens the legitimacy of audit, the 
profession seeks to fix the problem and maintain its standing with a change to audit 
standards. By doing so, it avoids to a disruptive force seeking new legislation, or an actor 
from a different order, say, a fintech firm with a corporate logic of venture capital 
maximization that might create a new business model that could replace the old ways of 
working. A logic can be threatened when a “precipitating jolt” (Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002) such as a new technology from another field encroaches and undermines the 
logic’s taken-for-grantedness. 
Identity as a mechanism of institutionalization 
Institutional theorists suggest that institutionalization takes place though identification of 
social actors with the rules, practices, and artifacts of an institution. It may occur through 
organizational isomorphism (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). Kodeih and Greenwood (2014) suggest 
that institutional complexity arises as social actors (organizations, groups, and individuals) 
display a commitment to conflicting logics that these rules, rituals, and artifacts embody. We 
can visualize the relationship of identity and the underpinning logic as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - Identity as vehicle for institutionalization 
In the professional order, identity develops as individuals adopt a logic that includes 
“craft” nature of the work and the personal reputation of the professional (Thornton et al., 
2012), conferring status to the professionals and distinguishing them from others. Their 
logics will be particularly threatened if the jolt comes in a form that raises doubt about the 
value of craftsmanship and thus the reputation and identity of the professional. 
Professions, professionals, and professionalism 
Theorists including see professions as a special form of occupational control. In the 
traditional, “collegiate” view, professionals are protectors of knowledge; to act 
professionally is to accept and play by the rules, suborning self-interest to the collective, as 
defined by the profession itself. But scholars following the lead of Johnson (1972) have 
taken a more critical stance. Johnson argues that the traditional view masks the way 
professionals carve out monopolies, using expertise to gain power and social standing. He 
calls that “professionalism,” but it is only one of the ways professions relate to the struggle 
for occupational control.1 Another is “patronage”, acting in service to powerful paymasters 
and providing rationalizations based in the discourse of the profession. Moreover, both can 
operate at the same time, where integrity and self-interest become uneasy bedfellows.  
Professionals thus represent a special and complex case of the interplay identity and 
institutions, in which contradictory professional-order logics confront contending corporate-
order ones. Viewed through an institutional lens, individual professionals may face 
conflicting logics, such as those that faced large accountancy firms as the development of 
new accounting technologies, including enterprise resource planning system, presented a 
business model (Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991). The opportunity for partner-profits 
relied much less on the knowledge of accountancy and audit than on scale economies and 
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add-on consulting revenues. It led audit firms to act more like corporations, adhering more to 
a logic of capital efficiency than professional integrity.  
We can see that in the stories of the biggest crisis in the profession – and the string of 
corporate failures that surrounded the collapse of Enron and the implosion of its auditor, 
Arthur Andersen (Carnegie & Napier, 2010). In this view, audit professionals, confronted 
with a logic of shareholder value imported from the corporate order, chose to subjugate the 
integrity of a professional logic to the corporate-like logic of profit (cf. Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013). Figure 2 shows the corporate/professional 
logics in a system of interacting logics and identities, with examples other orders and logics 
shaded out (cf. Thornton et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 2 - Corporate and professional logics and identities 
Corporate governance, agency and stewardship 
This dilemma has echoes of conflicting logics in corporate governance, as described in 
agency and stewardship theory. Agency theory sees managers and those who serve them as 
working from economic self-interest. To prevent loss of value they need to governance 
through monitoring and control (Fama, 1980). An alternative view starts with the assumption 
that people in organizations are motivated by non-material benefits, such as the desire to do a 
good job (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). This steward-like approach is other- 
rather than self-centered, and has affective as well as cognitive dimensions (Hernandez, 
2012).  
Moreover, the implications of agency and stewardship are opposite. Agency theory sees 
control as the mechanism of governance, while stewardship points to encouraging 
managerial discretion (Donaldson, 2008) and conducting governance through support for 
managers’ resource needs (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pugliese, Minichilli, & Zattoni, 2014). 
In the case of professionals, this discussion aligns traditional, collegiate professionalism with 
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stewardship theory, and professionals working under patronage conditions with agency 
theory (cf. Johnson, 1972). 
But the relationship may not be quite that simple. The critical stance in Johnson (1972) 
sees even the collegiate professional as self-interested, with autonomy and integrity of the 
profession serving that version of self. In the service of a powerful patron, and here we point 
back to the case of Enron, autonomy and integrity are suppressed, and self-interest becomes 
more evident. But self-interest is strong even in the traditional form of professionalism. 
Under Johnson’s argument, we can see that even traditional professionalism is a self-
interested logic, and the professional is an agent first and steward second, and yet the roles 
co-exist and co-exhibit.  
If the powerful patron is a corporation or an individual who operates under a corporate 
logic, the professional may come to identify with the organization as well as the profession, 
adding to the institutional complexity (Figure 3). The question then becomes: under which 
circumstances, and under what conditions one of those becomes dominant, and how both 
might peacefully co-exist? 
 
Figure 3 - Professional as agent/steward 
Methodology 
Our study examines institutional complexity and the interplay of logics from the 
corporate and professional orders through two cases involving professionals (internal 
auditors) operating in a shared corporate setting (food and consumers goods). One firm is an 
Egyptian subsidiary of a multinational corporation (MC). The other is a domestic company 
(DC), also in Egypt. Using a single country allows us to relate institutional pressures to 
organizational/professional dilemma without having to dwell quite so much on national or 
cultural imperatives.  
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The precipitating jolt was their near-simultaneous introduction of enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) software, purchased from the same supplier and implemented by largely the 
same consultants, using the same processes. Management of both firms thought the software 
would two key benefits: enhancing the quality of financial control (accuracy, efficiency) 
while also signaling accountability, especially to owners and regulators (legitimacy). Internal 
auditors were among the users of the software.  
This study adopted a multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). In 
each case, the same researcher (fluent in Arabic and English) used a semi-structured 
approach to interview a variety of personnel in both firms and the software vendor, 
conducted focus groups of internal auditors, reviewed internal documents of both firms, 
attended planning and implementation meetings, and observed interactions of the internal 
auditors with the new system.  
The research was conducted over a six-month period, with opportunities for follow-up 
interviews, in person and by telephone. Most of the interviews were recorded, while in few 
written notes were taken. To enhance credibility, after each interview the main points 
mentioned by the participant were summarized and sent to the interviewee for final 
confirmation. Moreover, the initial draft of each case study report was emailed to key 
participants in order to verify for accuracy and getting further feedback and clarification 
where necessary. 
The evidence was then analyzed thematically for the views about a wide range of topics 
about the process. This study focuses its findings on themes associated with the effect of the 
operational changes on the attitudes of personnel toward their identification with the firm 
and the profession, and the benefits and drawbacks of the changes to them as professionals 
and employees. Because of the length of time for research, we were also able to gain insights 
into the outcomes of the implementation and the attitudes of the internal auditors, post-
implementation.  
Balance of the paper 
The findings, organized by theoretical considerations and analyzing extended quotations 
from the interview data, illustrate institutional challenges and identity responses of internal 
auditors at the two firms. Our discussion shows that the introduction of ERP at the 
multinational corporation’s subsidiary strengthened both the internal audit team’s identity as 
professionals and their identification with the corporate logic. They become, if effect, hybrid 
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professionals (Blomgren & Waks, 2015), enacting corporate and professional logics, 
reconciling them through the overlapping elements of self-interest that allows 
professionalism to operate in both a traditional, collegiate fashion and in patronage mode. At 
the domestic company, by contrast, ERP led to a disruption of both professional identity and 
organizational loyalty. The internal audit function at DC shrank to merely symbolic presence 
(one individual), and that person’s work came to be controlled through the application of (of 
all things!) a sales target. We conclude by arguing that hybridity operates through alignment 
of significant elements of two otherwise competing logics, reconciling identity conflicts, but 
that the effects are contingent on other institutional forces, in these cases ones where 
corporate logics seems also to echo broader societal trends. 
                                               
1
 We have chosen not to discuss the third type of professional in Johnson (1972) – the 
mediating role – as it is not directly relevant to the cases we  examine. In a sense, however, 
the ERP software engineers are mediating professionals, but our concern is with the work of 
the internal auditors. 
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